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Abstract
Mannion and Braithwaite outline a new paradigm for studying and improving patient safety – Safety II. In this 
response, I argue that Safety I should not be dismissed simply because the safety management strategies that 
are developed and enacted in the name of Safety I are not always true to the original philosophy of ‘systems 
thinking.’
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Introduction
In the late 1980s, 1 in 1000 shunters (the railway staff who 
couple and uncouple trains) were killed working on the railway 
in Britain each year. In 1991 I embarked on a PhD exploring 
why shunters broke the rules that were there to keep them 
safe. I published the work in an article entitled ‘Not working 
to rule: Understanding procedural violations at work.’1 
While not my finest work, I am now, with the publication 
of Mannion and Braithwaite’s article,2 reinvigorated by the 
idea that I may have been one of the first people to really try 
to understand ‘work as done.’3 In fact, in the abstract of the 
paper I write: Generally, violations were perceived to be the 
result of a well-intentioned desire to get the job done. Shunters 
were not taking risks with their own lives because they were 
macho, thrill-seeking men, but because two-way radios were 
not working, sidings had curves in them (obscuring their 
view of the driver), shunting poles were sometimes difficult 
to use to couple the trains, requiring them to stand between 
carriages instead. The approach I took to studying shunters 
in situ, training to be one myself and spending many hours 
in shunting cabins, resonates absolutely with the emerging 
methods (ethnography4) and premise of Safety-II, although 
the language is quite different. I rather embarrassingly refer to 
violations, the nomenclature of the time, but I much prefer the 
less punitive and more subtle ‘work as done.’ My supervisor 
and mentor in this work was Professor James Reason, of 
Swiss-cheese and organisational-accident model fame.5 He, 
along with Lucian Leape in the United States,6 was one of the 
founders of the systems approach to safety, as pointed out 
in the Mannion and Braithwaite article. James Reason was 
an inspirational supervisor, so when he recommended that 
I immerse myself in shunting, don steel toe capped boots 
and a high visibility vest each morning, I did not question 
his motives. He recognised that to understand why people 
behave the way they do one needs to understand the person 
in their social and organisational context; in other words 
within the wider system. So this is what I did. I tell this story 
because I am not convinced that it is the Safety-I theories or 
models that are to blame for our lack of progress, but rather 
the operationalisation of these within healthcare systems. So 
here I ask were the dawns false or have we just ignored their 
eerie light? Let’s take one example, learning from past harm, 
to help elucidate this argument.
Many healthcare systems place ‘incident reporting’ at the heart 
of their safety management armoury, the primary purpose 
being to learn from these past harms. These systems suffer 
from low reporting rates7 and limited learning that appears 
to be related, at least in part, to poor feedback mechanisms.8 
Even more problematic, however, is that organisations (and 
wider systems) rarely act on the incident data to do those 
things that, according to systems thinking, are likely to make 
a difference to safety in the future – redesigning tasks and 
work-processes, promoting teamwork and interdisciplinary 
communication, redesigning equipment or workplaces, and 
developing leaders that support staff wellbeing.9 The problem 
is one of both poor quality incident investigations and a 
failure to act on those contributory factors identified. Indeed, 
some responses to incidents, such as writing new procedures, 
disciplining and retraining staff, serve only to add to the system 
problem and often show little resemblance to the contributory 
factors identified in the incident investigation. We are now 
moving into an era where we recognise that measuring and 
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monitoring safety is about much more than just past harm10 
and, of course, it is naïve to think that incident reporting 
systems are the panacea of patient safety. However this shift 
in thinking away from a focus on past harm is not a function 
of Safety-II. In fact, the idea of frontline staff requiring ‘error 
wisdom’ and acting on the here and now was promoted within 
Safety I by Reason11 amongst others. 
Patient safety has also suffered, at least to some extent, from 
the application of a clinical lens. Patient safety incidents, 
like diseases and illnesses have been categorised and treated. 
So many of the interventions we have developed tackle 
specific negative outcomes (eg, falls prevention, pressure 
ulcer prevention, sepsis prevention, infection prevention) 
yet so many of the factors contributing to incidents (inter-
professional rivalry, work environment, equipment that is 
poorly designed, poor staffing levels and high workload) are 
not unique to a particular outcome, they are common across 
all. Local safety/improvement projects may demonstrate 
improvements eg, a reduction in falls on a hospital ward, by 
encouraging staff to more reliably enact a process. However, 
the consequences of these interventions might not always 
be as anticipated – other patient safety outcomes might be 
ignored. For example, patients might return home with 
reduced mobility because their movement in hospital has 
been so restricted that they are now deconditioned. This, in 
turn increases their likelihood of falling within the home. In 
other words, we have simply shifted the problem of falls to 
elsewhere in the system. 
What we have failed to understand is that very many of the 
system factors that underpin safety are not amenable to 
local change and some are not amenable to organisational 
change, instead requiring intervention from those funding 
professional training or designing and manufacturing medical 
devices or setting targets. Others have written eloquently on 
this subject,12 but for me the simple metaphor that we have 
focused our attention on swatting mosquitoes, rather than on 
draining swamps, is sufficient. To blame Safety-I and systems 
theory for the ‘quick fix’ approach to dealing with safety 
problems is difficult to justify. 
Systems thinking may have, as Mannion and Braithwaite 
suggest, been embraced by those who seek simple cause-
effect relationships and espouse the use of root cause analysis, 
but the originators were much more sophisticated in their 
thinking. There is nothing simplistic and linear in the 
following explanation of systems thinking in ‘An Organisation 
with a memory’ (2000).13 
The system approach … recognises that many of the problems 
facing organisations are complex, ill-defined and result from 
the interaction of a number of factors.… Errors are seen as 
being shaped and provoked by ‘upstream’ systemic factors, 
which include the organisation’s strategy, its culture and the 
approach of management towards risk and uncertainty…. The 
system approach recognises the importance of resilience within 
organisations and also recognises the process of learning as 
enhancing such resilience.
The term resilience is now associated with Safety-II and is 
used in the title of a number of Jeffrey Braithwaite’s series 
of books, but here it is clear that the term is being used 
very much within the Safety I paradigm. The inquiries into 
major disasters of the 1980s and 1990s also demonstrate this 
sophistication in thinking. For example, Lord Cullen14 who 
led the inquiries into both Piper Alpha and Ladbroke Grove 
disasters writes:
“I examined the significance of whatever had a tenable 
connection with the chain of events which led up to the 
catastrophe, and I also took account of other factors which 
played no part in bringing about the result, but which were in 
themselves cause for concern.” 
What Lord Cullen recognises in this comment is that a 
negative outcome is actually an opportunity to gain a better 
understanding of the way the complex socio-technical system 
works to produce the outcomes it does. However, what differs 
from a Safety II perspective is that the adaptations that are 
made to work around/ cope with system failures are construed 
more positively as resilient behaviours rather than errors.15 By 
so doing, it may be possible to reduce the shame and blame 
response that still exists in healthcare.16,17 
So, while I agree with Mannion and Braithwaite that ‘top-
down, standardised policy, regulations and linear-style 
interventions’ are limited in their effectiveness, I do not agree 
that systems thinking, as initially conceived at least, supports 
this way of doing things. Indeed my experience of working 
within this paradigm has led to interventions that promote 
the patient voice18 or empower the staff to deliver change.19 
In other words, I think it is the way we have ‘done’ Safety I 
and continue to do so that is the problem, rather than that the 
founding principles of Systems thinking are fundamentally 
flawed. Perhaps, by turning safety on its head and asking 
different questions about how we promote excellence, how 
we learn from what goes well, how we understand work as 
imagined and work as done, we will develop different ways 
of ‘doing’ safety. Intuitively it is hard to disagree with this 
sentiment and a shift towards this more positive language and 
message of Safety II seems to be of the time. Healthcare staff 
need to hear the message that excellence is possible, that they 
are doing a good job despite their working context, and that 
we recognise their resilience. This is a message that is too little 
heard as we try repeatedly to swat mosquitoes that just won’t 
go away.
However, we do not yet know what types of solutions and 
interventions Safety II might produce and indeed some 
proponents (Hollnagel, personal communication) believe 
that organisational resilience is an emergent property that we 
should understand but not expect to be able to engineer. There 
is, of course, the possibility that, with limited resources and a 
‘command’ culture, Safety II will serve only to identify those 
‘excellent’ things that others must aspire to and new rules and 
protocols spring up in an attempt to produce more ‘excellence.’ 
Another possible future is one where we identify and praise 
resilience amongst staff, teams and organisations and we fail 
to improve, simplify and transform those systems that require 
staff to repeatedly adapt and flex and find workarounds. 
Neither of these two possible futures are desirable. 
If, on the other hand, Safety II is the beginning of a different 
‘way of doing things’ where staff feel they can lead change and 
improve from the bottom-up the imperfect system in which 
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